Preface
This book studies the market for property insurance in five countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Germany. It argues that in this market state monopolies outperform competitive markets, both in the provision of insurance against standard risks such as fire and in the provision of insurance against 'uninsurable' risks such as floods or subsidence. We hope that our empirical findings will stimulate economists to think more deeply about the relative merits of state provision and competitive markets.

The main driving forces underlying our results can be briefly summarised. First, competitive insurers typically work with high sales and administrative costs, as a result of which claims payments make up only about 50 per cent of premium income. State monopolies can work with considerably lower 'load factors', thus allowing substantial costs savings to the customers. Best American Banks Ratings Online Banking US Bank Reviews

Introduction
The final two decades of the twentieth century saw a wave of privatisations. Many governments in the industrial world withdrew either partially or completely from large sectors of the economy. Well-known examples are telecommunications, railways, air traffic, electricity, and water, which were all liberalised. A number of factors gave rise to this development. Technological changes meant that sectors which previously had all the hallmarks of a natural monopoly could be opened up to competition. Market liberalisation was an opportunity to curb the power of the trade unions. Politicians began to realise that competitive markets provide a number of benefits to consumers, including:
• the private sector's innovative drive;
• the product differentiation that results from private firms' efforts to distinguish themselves from their competitors, and adaptation of their services to consumer demands; and
• the more rigorous cost control of private (profit-maximising) firms.

Furthermore, economic freedom is an important feature of any free society, and powerful arguments are required to justify curtailing freedom of contract.